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What Does Aid to Africa  The development  community
seems  to have swung from a
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Summary findings
If a donor  gives aid for a project that the recipient  The fungibility of loans to specific sectors generally
government would have undertaken  anyway, the aid  mirrors patterns found in a broader sampie of countries.
finances expenditures other than the intended  project.  Aid to energy, transport,  and communication sectors
The notion that aid in this sense may be "fungible" has  increases public spending in those sectors somewhlat  but
recently received empirical support.  by no means one for one. (By contrast, in the worldwide
Devarajan, Rajkumar, and Swaroop look at why aid is  sample, aid to transport and communications was almost
fungible or nonfungible, and the extent to which it is  fully nonfungible.)
fungible in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Aid to the education sector - which had no
Their results suggest that aid may be partially fungible  discernible effect on education spending in the global
in Africa and suggest some reasons.  sample - had an almost one-for-one effect on education
They find relatively little evidence that aid leads to  spending in Africa.
greater tax relief in Africa. Every dollar of aid leads to a  Even in these partially fungible sectors, governments
90-cent increase in government spending.  spend more out of aid resources than they do out of their
The implications of this result are by no means clear. If  own resources, at the margin. Governments do not spend
the marginal cost of taxation is exceptionally high - all sectoral aid in that sector -nor  do they treat such
which it might be in African countries - using aid for  aid as merely budgetary support.
tax relief may be the best use of foreign resources.  The more donors to a country, the more likely aid is to
Aid's effect on the composition of current  and capital  be fungible. If the number of donors represents a proxy
spending? They increase equally. Even if all aid were  for monitoring costs, it is not surprising that most aid is
intended  to finance capital spending, the reallocation to  partly fungible.
current spending might not necessarily be harmful.
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Suppose an  aid donor  gives  money to build  a primary  school  in  a poor  country. If the
recipient government would have built the school anyway, then the consequence of the aid is to
release resources for the government to  spend on other items. Thus, while the primary school
may  still  get  built,  the  aid  is  financing  some  other  expenditure  (or  tax  reduction)  by  the
government. This could be problematic, especially from a donor's  perspective, if the released
resources of the government end up financing "unproductive" public expenditures.
That foreign aid is in this sense "fungible" has been recognized for a long time. In 1947, Paul
Rosenstein-Rodin,  then Deputy Director of the World Bank's  Economics Department, noted:
"When the World Bank thinks it is financing an electric power station, it is really financing  a
brothel." In the mid-1950s,  some of the Bank's  member countries asked  for a revision of its
policy of lending only for infrastructure because they wanted to borrow for health and education
projects.  The  World  Bank's  president  responded  that  they  could  finance  their  health  and
education projects with the funds that were released by the Bank's financing of infrastructure.
In light of the recent re-thinking of foreign aid, brought on by "aid fatigue" in donor nations
and questions  of aid's  effectiveness, this paper examines the extent  of aid fungibility in  Sub-
Saharan Africa. Before proceeding, we note that the two anecdotes  illustrate some important
aspects of fungibility. First, the question of what aid ultimately finances is interesting only if the
preferences  of  the  donor  are  different  from  those  of  the  recipient.  If  they  had  identical
preferences, then it would not matter if the aid were given to a specific project or as budgetary
support. Second, when donor and recipient preferences differ, it is  still not  clear whether the
presence  of fungibility is good or bad. It  all depends on what the  government does with  the
resources  that  are released  by the  aid projects-whether  it builds  pyramids  or health  clinics.
I Third, regardless of what the government does with the released resources,  aid fungibility has
important implications for how donors evaluate the impact of their aid. To the extent that aid is
fungible, the development impact of the electric power station loan is not captured by the rate of
return of that project (Devarajan et al. [1997]).
Despite its importance to policy, the question of the fungibility of aid remained at the level of
anecdotes for over four decades. Recently, however, there has been a flurry of quantitative work,
triggered on the one hand by heightened concern over the effectiveness of foreign aid (Boone
[1  9951, World Bank [1998]), and on the other hand by the availability of data (Cashel-Cordo and
Craig [1990], Gang and Khan [1991], Pack and Pack [1990, 1993, 1996], Khilji and Zampelli
[1994], Feyzioglu et al. [1998], Jha and Swaroop [1998]).
The recent work has shown that foreign aid is fungible in certain countries and in  certain
sectors. For instance, Pack and Pack find that aid is totally fungible in the Dominican Republic,
non-fungible in Indonesia and partially fungible in Sri Lanka. Jha and Swaroop [1998] show that
aid to India is fungible at the national level, but non-fungible at the state level. Using a panel data
set, Feyzioglu et al. [1998] find that foreign aid is fungible in agriculture, education and health,
partially  fungible in  power and non-fungible in transport  and communication. None  of these
authors has offered an explanation for their results.
No region will be more affected by these changes than Sub-Saharan Africa, which receives
three  times  more  foreign  aid  per  capita  than  other  developing  countries.  Some  of  the
disappointing results on the effectiveness of aid in Africa may be due to its fungibility. Yet, none
of the studies on aid fungibility has focused on Africa.
The purpose of this paper is to fill these two lacunae in our understanding of the fungibility
of foreign aid: why aid is fungible or non-fungible, and the extent of aid fungibility in Africa.  In
2section 2, we present a model of aid fimgibility. In section 3, we estimate the model using data
from Africa. Our estimates permit us to compare the extent of  aid fungibility in Africa with
respect to other countries, as well as identify some of the reasons why aid may or may not be
fungible in Africa. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks about the implications of our
results for policy and future research.
2.  A Model of Semi-fungible Aid
In this  section,  we present a  simple model that illuminates why  aid may or may not  be
fungible. A variant of the models in Pack and Pack [1993] and Feyzioglu et al. [19981,  the model
incorporates the essential element in any discussion about fungibility, namely, a difference in the
objective  functions of the  recipient and  donor.  Consider, therefore,  an  aid recipient with  an
objective  finction  over two types  of expenditure, g,  and  g2,  and domestic revenue R. In the
absence of aid, the recipient's problem is to maximize
U(g 1,g 2 )  = g1ag2 -a  subjectto
R  pigi  + p2g2.
The recipient's  problem  gives  rise  to  the  standard optimal  solutions,  g,  and  g2*.  Now
suppose the donor has a different objective function over the recipient's  expenditure on gi  and
g2:
U(g1,g2 )=g 1 g 2
1 ,  with  , > a>0.
Thus, the donor would like the recipient to spend more on good 1 than the recipient would
otherwise. For example, good  1 could be education, which the donor has targeted as a priority
sector. The donor's aid policy, then, is to give the recipient (,  6-  a) R to spend on gi.1
1  As noted above,  we are only modeling  foreign  aid in the case when  there is a difference  in the
objective  functions  of the recipient  and the donor.  Thus, P#ci.  Note that even with this aid,  the recipients'
3Given the difference in objective functions, the recipient would like to treat this aid as
budgetary  support. But there are costs to treating  earmarked  aid as fully fungible.  For instance,  it
could lead to a cutback in aid the following  year. We assume these costs (or, equivalently,  the
donor's ability to monitor expenditures)  are a function of the deviation between the donor's
desired total expenditure on good 1, plgl  , and the actual amount spent on that good. The
recipient's new optimization  problem,  therefore,  is to maximize
U(9gg2)  = g.'92  I-a  subject  to
R + (/3-  a)R =pigi +p2g2+ 0(pigl**  -pig)
where 0 is the cost of treating earmarked  aid as fully fungible. Although  this cost is probably
borne in the future (in terms of less foreign aid than would otherwise  have been given), we
incorporate  it as a charge  today  by considering  the present  value of this future  cost.
An interior  solution  to the above  problem  exists  if 9 < (,B  - a)I,6:
pig,  =  (  -0  R+  a  AID  (2.1)
1-90  1- 0
where  AID =  (,B  - a)R. If 0  9  (,B  - a)I,B,  the cost of treating  earmarked  aid as fully fungible  is so
prohibitively  high that pig,  = plgl**  = aR  + (/3  - a) R,  i.e., aid is spent on gi as desired  by the
donor. On the other hand, when 0 = 0, there is no penalty for treating  aid as budgetary support,
so the coefficient  for R becomes  the same as that for AID. These two scenarios  are illustrated  in
Figure 1.
[Figure  11
The most important feature, however, is that equation (2.1) lends itself to  econometric
estimation,  since the variables  R and AID are in principle  observable.  By estimating  a variant of
expenditure  on good  2 may not be optimal  from the donor's perspective.  However,  what we are modeling
4equation  (2.1), in the next section, we  attempt to  figure out  how fungible aid is  in different
sectors.
Before proceeding to the empirical estimation, we treat one other issue that is often raised in
discussing  aid fungibility. That is the possibility that aid does not release resources for other
expenditures but that it does reduce tax effort. From the reasoning of the previous section, if the
aid were  earmarked for some  expenditure that would have taken place  anyway, the recipient
government could use the funds released for some other spending or to reduce the amount of
taxes it collects. In fact, if the marginal cost of taxation is high, this may be a prudent strategy for
the recipient. To capture this possibility, we rewrite the recipient's utility function as
U(91, 92, I-R):
where the (1-R) term represents the share of gross domestic product (GDP)  available to the private
sector. The recipient's problem now is to maximize
U(g,g 2 ,l - R) =  g 1a9g 2 a2  (1  - R)')  subject  to
R=pigi  +P2g29
The first-order conditions to this problem yield R =1 - a3. When the country receives aid in
the amount a (assume it is intended for budgetary support), the solution to the new maximization
problem yields R =  1 - a3 - a3  a. Thus, the amount of aid that is diverted  for reducing  tax effort
will be a function of the relative weight of the tax distortion (a3) compared with the productivity
of the other two expenditures in the utility function. In short, the recipient has the same incentive
to  divert  aid  toward  tax  reduction  as  towards  other  expenditures:  the  amount  of  diversion
depends on the productivity of expenditures and the costs of taxation.
here is the fact that we observe  aid directed  at particular  sectors,  that is, projects.
5The above model describes fairly closely the situation of several African countries. In the
past several decades, Sub-Saharan Africa has received more foreign aid-both  in gross as well as
net terms-than  any other region. Between 1970 and  1995, average per capita aid to all Sub-
Saharan African countries was US$23 (measured in current dollars); the average for all other
developing  countries  was  less  than  US$8.  A  number  of  studies  have  documented  the  aid
experience of Africa.2 In analyzing the growth performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, Easterly and
Levine  [1993] looked at, among other variables, the  impact of external  income. Their  main
finding was that an annual increase in external income-from  better terms of trade and transfers
(grants and loans)-equal  to  1 percentage point of GDP raises growth by 0.6 percentage points.
Helleiner [1992] and Demery and Husain [1993] have argued that during the 1980s foreign aid to
Sub-Saharan Africa financed real imports and aid was instrumental in allowing several countries
to move out of the import-compression phase. Were aid flows to Africa financing expenditures
that would otherwise not be made? Were aid-financed imports truly marginal? Has aid to Sub-
Saharan Africa been fungible? If so, why, and if not, why not? These are the issues to which we
now turn.
3.  Empirical Analysis
The  model  in  section  2  develops links  between foreign  aid and  fiscal  variables.  In  our
empirical analysis, we examine these links. Using a panel database from 18 Sub-Saharan African
countries (more on this  below), we  first estimate the  statistical relationship  between foreign
assistance, measured in gross terms, and total public spending. To determine which expenditure
items were funded by foreign aid, we examine the link between total foreign aid and various
public-spending activities. The impact of earmarked sector-specific aid on sectoral spending is
2 See World Bank [1994] for a review.
6estimated next. Finally, we examine whether the "fungibility coefficient" is affected by donors'
monitoring  costs.  Specifically,  we  assess  whether the  number  of aid  donors in  a particular
country-a  proxy for monitoring costs-affects  the fungibility analysis.
3.1 Empirical research on aidfungibility
Empirical research on the fungibility of aid has been done in individual countries using time-
series data.  Gang and Khan [1991], Gupta [1993], Jha and Swaroop [1998], McGuire  [1978],
Pack  and  Pack  [1990,  1993, 1996], among  others, have  analyzed aid fungibility  across the
sectoral classification  of expenditures. In a  study of foreign aid to Indonesia, Pack and  Pack
[1990] did not find any evidence of fungibility across sectoral expenditures. On the other hand,
in the Dominican Republic they (Pack and Pack [1993]) found evidence of substantial diversion
of foreign aid away from its intended purposes. The main innovation in Jha and Swaroop [1998]
is to incorporate the intergovernmental fiscal link in examining economic fungibility of external
assistance  in India. Using data on India, a federal  country, they find that  external assistance
intended for development purposes merely substitutes for spending that governments-central
and states-would  have undertaken anyway; the funds freed by aid are spent on nondevelopment
activities  in  general  and  administrative services in  particular.  Moreover,  in  passing  external
assistance to states, the central government makes a reduction in other transfers to states.
The  individual  country  studies,  while  important,  do  not  allow  any  cross-country
generalization,  which  could  be  useful  information to  the  donor  community.  The  study  by
Feyzioglu et al.  [1998] uses a cross-country panel data set to analyze the relationship between
sector-specific foreign aid and government expenditure on the agriculture, defense, education,
energy,  health,  and  transport/communications  sectors.  They  find  that  developing  country
7governments  receiving earmarked concessionary  loans for agriculture, education and energy,
reduce  their own  resources  going  to these sectors  and use it elsewhere;  only loans  to the transport
and communication  sector are fully spent  on purposes  intended  by donors.  There are a few other
cross-country  studies  that have analyzed  the issue of fungibility.  Cashel-Cordo  and Craig [1990]
used a sample of 46 developing  countries to analyze whether or not foreign aid changes the
composition of government expenditure.  The expenditure  components in their analysis are,
however, limited  to defense and nondefense  spending.  The study by Khilji and Zampelli  [1994]
also looks at defense and nondefense expenditures  in examining the fungibility of U.S. aid
among  eight major aid recipient  countries.
3.2 Data, choice of variables and sample statistics
Our empirical  analysis  is based on a panel database  that has annual observations  on 18 Sub-
Saharan African countries from 1971 to  1995. The countries included in the  sample are:
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,  Ethiopia, Ghana, The Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho,
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Nigeria, Sudan,  Swaziland,  Zaire, Zambia,  and Zimbabwe.  The
sample choice-number of countries  and time period-was  based on data availability  for all the
relevant variables, subject to the constraint  that at least 10 years of complete data had to be
available  for each country  in the sample. (For more information  on the sample selection  method
and data sources, see the Data Appendix.)  The panel data are organized  along three dimensions:
(i) foreign  aid variables;  (ii) fiscal variables  (public  spending  and revenue);  and (iii) income and
control  variables.
(i) Foreign aid data. Our main aid variable  is the total annual  gross disbursement  of Official
Development Assistance (ODA)  by all bilateral and multilateral sources, reported in an aid
8publication of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (oECD).  ODA  has
two components: grants and concessionary loans. To examine the impact of sector specific aid
on  sectoral spending, we had to  use concessionary loans as the aid variable  since no sector-
specific information on grants is available. The data on sector-specific concessionary loans are
available from the World Bank database. Data on total aid were also used to derive the variable
we used as a proxy for the level of monitoring exerted on aid recipients.
(ii) Fiscal  data.  Our  main  source  of  fiscal  data (public  spending  and  revenue)  is  the
International  Monetary  Fund's  (IMF)  database  on  Government  Finance  Statistics.  In  the
definition of total public spending, we have included principal payments on concessionary loans.
This adjustment was made because we were interested in finding out how much, if at all, aid was
being used to finance principal payments due on past loans. For this reason, we also measure
foreign aid in gross (as opposed to net) terms though we do not know if part of the aid was given
for debt rescheduling or was an untied budgetary support. In terms of the composition of public
spending we collected data for our sample countries on current, capital, and loan repayments on
the  one  hand,  and  sectoral  (agriculture,  education,  energy,  health,  industry,  transport  and
communication) spending on the other. We were also interested in finding out if any of the aid
money  was  channeled  towards  interest  payments  on  foreign  debt.  We  therefore  obtained
information on this variable for each country from the OECD database.
(iii)  Data on income  and control variables. The database includes  data on  GDP, infant
mortality,  gross primary  and  secondary school  enrollment rates, population  and the  share  of
agriculture in national income.
Table  1 shows the summary statistics for the  18-country sample. Measured  in  1995 U.S.
dollars the mean per capita GDP  over the period 1970 through 1995 is US$837. Over this period,
9the cross-country means range from a low of $178 (Ethiopia) to $1,951 (Mauritius).
[Table  11
The mean size of government (measured as the share of total government spending in GDP)  in
these countries is close to 28 percent. Once again we see a large variation in terms of cross-
country means: The range is from 11.2 percent for Burkina Faso to 52.7 percent for Lesotho. The
average share of foreign aid in GDP for this group of Sub-Saharan African countries is 10 percent.
Nigeria, a major oil producer and exporter, is at the lower end (0.2 percent of GDP).  When aid is
measured as a percentage  of GDP,  The Gambia is the largest recipient. However, in per  capita
terms, Botswana  is the country in the  sample that received the highest  foreign aid. Finally,
roughly two-thirds of total aid is in the form of grants for this group of countries.
Figures  2  and  3  show  the  sectoral  breakdown  of  concessionary  loans  and  government
expenditure, respectively. 3 Almost  40 percent  of the  concessionary  loans  have gone  to  four
sectors: agriculture,  energy, industry, and transport and communications.  It is  clear from  the
figure that there were not too many concessional loans to education and health. 4 Among the six
sectors,  education  accounts  for  most  of  the  public  spending.  Next  are  transport  and
communication  and  agriculture.  As  a  crude  indicator,  these  figures  signal  that  donor  and
recipient preferences may not be identical.
[Figures  2 and 3]
3.3 Regression analysis
Foreign aid fungibility is analyzed by estimating the following three equations:
3 Concessionary  loans to "other"  sectors  includes  multisector  loans,  balance  of payments  support,
administrative  budget support,  and loans to sectors  that cannot  be identified.
4 It is possible  that a lot of assistance  was given  to education  and health sectors in the form of grants.
Lack of data precludes  us from analyzing  the composition  of grants.
10G1, = a,  + a,Aidj, + a 2GDPFt  l +  ±,
for country i (i=l,...,I) at time t (t=l,...,T);  (3.1)
G,E, = 9  +  9 GDP,,l  + 92Aide, + 3(G,  - ) + Vj,  (3.2)
where  Ej {j=1,2,3} are current, capital and principal repayment expenditures and  G0 is total
GN domestic resources defined as total expenditures net of foreign aid.  i '  is estimated as
C'v,N  = A3i + 4,8A  id j,  +J2 GDP,,1 (3.2')
This two-stage estimation procedure is used because foreign aid affects the composition of
public spending directly as well as indirectly (more on this below). Similarly, for each sector s (s
S) we have:
t=i A  +  ±AsGDIP,  ± _2A  Cloanis  +2  3(G/G, -(NG7s,)  +2 45(Tloan,  - Cloan,",)
+ 25,TGrantsj,  + qi  , ,  (3.3)
where  GINs,  is estimated as:
GjiN,i,  = 00  i  + A,,GDPJ,,- 1 + 02s  Cloan  s', + 03',  (Tloani,  - Cloani s,)
+ 04, TGrantsj,  (3.3')
Eq. (3.1) examines the impact of total foreign aid on the government's  budget. This model
incorporates the possibility that if the aid was earmarked for some expenditure that would have
taken  place  anyway,  the recipient  government could use  the  funds released  for some  other
spending or to reduce the amount of taxes it collects.
In section 2, we derived the condition that links public spending on good i with domestic
revenue R and  foreign aid (for example, see eq. 2.1). Equations  (3.2) and  (3.3) estimate this
relationship for various types of public expenditure. However, we know that domestic resources
11may  change  with  a  change  in  foreign aid. Since we  are interested  in the  effects  on  public
expenditure of domestic resources and foreign aid, independently of each other, we control for
the impact of aid on total domestic resources. This is done using a two-stage estimation process.
Eq. (3.2') indicates the first stage estimation for capital and current expenditure, and for principal
repayments. The residuals from  eq. (3.2')  are then used in place  of in eq.  (3.2), which is the
second-stage estimation. Similarly, the residuals from eq. (3.3')  are used in place of GN in eq.
(3.3), which estimates the impact of sector aid and domestic resources on sector expenditure.
The variables in the above mentioned three regressions are (all measured in 1995 US$, per
capita terms):
GDPi,t:  Gross domestic product for country i at time t
Gjj :  Total government expenditure
Go  tN:  Total government expenditure (net of foreign aid)
Gi't j  Government expenditure for current, capital or principal repayment purposes,
where Ej {j=1,2,3  } is current, capital or principal repayment expenditure,
respectively
Gi,,,t:  Government expenditure in sector s
Aidij :  Total gross ODA disbursement
CLoani  s t:  Gross concessionary loan disbursement to sector s
TLoan, t:  Total concessionary loans to all sectors
TGrantsi, :  Total grants to all sectors
s i,t, vi,t &  71  i,s,t:  White  noise error terms  for the three  equations.
We would ideally like to include sector-specific grants in equation (3.3). However, data on
grant disbursements are available only at the aggregate level, and not by sector (see subsection
3.2 above). Thus we have to use concessionary loans as our sector-aid variable.
Loans to a particular sector may be correlated with loans to other sectors and with grants. To
avoid bias in our estimates, we include the latter as additional right-hand-side variables in eqs.
(3.3') and (3.3), although these are not the variable coefficients we are primarily interested in.
12Table 2 presents the estimates of eqs. (3.1), (3.2) and (3.2') which are all estimated under the
null hypothesis that the coefficient of the country dummy variable,  a,,,  is a fixed parameter. If,
however, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the appropriate model is fixed effects
then the random effects model is estimated. 5
[Table 21
Regression  (2.1)  shows  a  positive  and  statistically  significant relationship between  total
public  spending and the total gross disbursement of  ODA.  The regression  shows that a dollar
increase  in  foreign aid leads to  an increase  of 0.89 cents in  total  government  spending; the
remaining aid is used for tax relief. 6 Moreover, a dollar increase in last year's  GDP  leads to an
increase of 11 cents in government expenditures. This evidence suggests that in this sample of 18
Sub-Saharan African countries, very little aid, if any, is being used for tax relief. At the margin,
most aid is associated-in  a statistical sense-with  an increase in government spending.
Regression (2.2) is estimated to control for the effect of foreign aid and GDP on the domestic
resources of the government. The residuals of this equation are used as an exogenous variable in
the  subsequent  equations  reported  in  this  table.  In  turn,  this  variable  represents  the  true
exogenous  shock  to  a  country's  domestic  resources.  Regression  (2.3),  which  includes
expenditure according to the economic classification of  IMF's  Government Financial Statistics,
indicates that roughly 28 cents of an additional dollar in ODA  is  spent on government's  capital
5In the fixed  effects model, a,i,  the country  dummy  parameter,  is a fixed coefficient.  In the random
effects  model these  parameters  are assumed  to be independent  random  variables  with a fixed mean  and
variance,  i.e., ao,i = a0 +  ,. Hausman  has developed  a test, which shows  that under  the null hypothesis
the fixed effects  model is appropriate  and the preferred  estimator  is least squares  with dummy  variables.
If, however,  the fixed effects  model is rejected in favor  of the random  effects  model  then the preferred
estimator  is generalized  least squares.  For details, see Hausman  [1978].
6In  some developing  countries,  not all foreign  aid goes  through  the budget. Our aid data (from
OECD  sources)  are likely to be different  from that of budgetary  aid receipts  of the Sub-Saharan  African
governments. It is therefore  possible  that some of the other 11  cents of the marginal  dollar  in aid
represents  extra-budgetary  aid.
13expenditure. Moreover,  the coefficient of  ODA  in regression  (2.4) shows that 30 cents of the
dollar increase in aid goes toward current expenditure. These findings may not be necessarily
bad for at least two reasons. First, parts of foreign aid could be designed for current expenditure
related activities.  Second, several components of  current expenditure, such as operations  and
maintenance,  may  have  higher  rates  of  return  than  capital  expenditure. 7 Finally,  the  aid
coefficient  in  regression  (2.5)  shows that 31  cents of the marginal  dollar are being used  to
finance  principal  repayments  on  the  foreign  concessionary  loans.  A  comparison  of  the
coefficients on the aid variable with the coefficients on the variable "residuals of total spending
net  of  aid"  suggests that  at the  margin more money  is spent  on  current  expenditure if  the
financing is from own domestic sources. For capital spending, however, the source of additional
resources  do not matter;  be it foreign or domestic, 28 cents of an  additional dollar is spent.
Regression (2.5) indicates that none of the additional domestic resources is used to finance debt
repayments.
Table 3 provides the estimates of the same equations as reported in table 2 except that the aid
variable in these equations is broken in its two components: concessionary loans and grants. As
indicated in eq. 3. 1, the impact of the two aid variables on total public expenditure is remarkably
identical.  In  their  analysis  of  14 developing countries  (of which  four  were  in  Sub-Saharan
Africa), Feyzioglu et al. [1998] found that disbursement of concessionary loans were far more
stimulative of total government expenditures than was total aid. As conjectured in their paper,
however, the difference in the two coefficients could be due to the bias introduced in the estimate
of concessionary loans for not including data on grants. An important finding reflected in eq. 3.5
of our table 3 is that it is only grants and not loans that are used to repay the principal on loans.
' In a study of 43 developing  countries  over 20 years, Devarajan,  Swaroop  and Zou [1996]  show that
the only broad public expenditure  category  that is associated  with higher  economic  growth  is the current
expenditure.
14Moreover, concessionary loans are used more for current than capital purposes (Regressions 3.3
and 3.4).
[Table 31
Table 4 has the estimates of regression (3.3). Regressions reported in this table examine the
link between the  gross disbursement of concessionary loans to  a particular  sector and public
spending in that sector.
[Table  41
In each of the six sectoral regressions-one  each for agriculture, energy, industry, transport
and  communication, education and health-the  coefficient on the variable "residuals  of  total
spending net of aid" indicates how the government distributes an additional dollar that  it gets
from all resources net of concessionary loans. Comparing these coefficients with the coefficients
on the sectoral-aid variable (loans to sector) indicate the level of fungibility at the sectoral level.
Only concessionary loans to the education, energy, and transport and communication sectors 8
show a positive and statistically significant relationship with their respective sectoral spending.
The regression  on the  energy sector shows that  a dollar increase  in  sectoral aid leads to  an
increase of 13 cents in energy sector spending; the remaining aid is used elsewhere. Moreover,
when governments get an extra dollar in domestic resources they only spend, on average, 1 cent
on the energy sector. Comparing the two coefficients suggests that aid to the energy sector is
partially  fungible.  Evidence  from  the transport  and  communication  sector  (T&C) reveals  a
similar story. The increase in sectoral spending from own resources is 13 cents but it jumps to 36
cents from aid resources, thus indicating a case of partial fungibility. Aid to education, however,
is being spent almost fully in the sector. Since in education, teacher wages are nearly 95 percent
8 As noted at the bottom  of table 4, Botswana  is evidently  an outlier for the education  regression.  The
analysis  in the text focuses  on regression  (4.7),  without  Botswana  in the sample.
15of the budget, it is likely that aid finances nearly everything else at the margin. Other sectoral
regressions-agriculture,  health, and industry-indicate  that there is no evidence from this group
of  countries that  aid to these  sectors is  increasing spending  in the  sectors  for which  it was
intended.
3.4 Regression analysis: What determines the level offungibility?
The sector regressions in the previous section assume that the level of fungibility, which is
captured by the parameter  0 in equation  (2.1), is the  same across countries. A more realistic
approach may be to allow the coefficient of the sector-aid variable in the regressions-which  is
positively related to  0 (see equation 2.1)-to  be a function of the degree of monitoring exerted
by aid donors on the recipient country. Since we cannot observe this degree of monitoring, we
use  a  proxy  for  it:  the  total  number  of aid  donors. A donor  would  have  greater  difficulty
monitoring his aid program if he is one of several donors in the country, compared with the case
if he is the only donor. Given a particular level of aid to a country (for any given sector), we
would expect the number of donors to be inversely correlated with the level of monitoring, and
hence with the coefficient of the sector aid variable in the regressions.
To test this hypothesis,  we modify equation (3.3), allowing the coefficient  of our sector-
specific  aid variable, X 2,i,,t9,  to be a linear function  of the total number  of aid donors  to country  i,
Ndj , :
4!ist= h0,I..,  +  Al sNdil  (34
In this flexible specification, ho  X  s is allowed to vary across the 18 countries. However, h,s is
the same for all countries (for any given sector). The parameter  hl5 measures the relationship
16between changes in the number of donors (Ndj,)  and changes in the coefficient  of sector aid
Using equation (3.4) to substitute into (3.3) we get the following estimable equation:
18
,=  i,)i+  A,GDP1,,l  + E  ho,  ij(CDummyjCloanj  , ,) + hj,(Ndj.Cloansj s  ,)
J=1
+  23,s(Gi,st  - G  ) +  - 4 jTloan,-  Cloani  , 8 ) + A  ,TGrantsj,  + 77,,  (3
where  CDummyj  is a country dummy for country j.  10  This  equation includes  19 interaction
terms on the right-hand side: (i)  CDummyjx  Cloan's,  (country dummy (S) concessionary loans
to sector), using in turn each of the 18 country dummies; and (ii)  Nd,, x  Cloan's,  (number of
donors  > concessionary loans to sector). The other right-hand side variables in equation (3.5)
also appear in equation (3.3).
Equation (3.5) was estimated for each of the defined sectors. The key results are shown in
table 5. Given the large number of regressors, we only report the estimated value (with t-statistic)
of the coefficient we are mainly  interested in, that of  Ndj, x  Cloanj',  (number of donors  <2>
concessionary loans to sector). We thus present estimates for h4, in equations (3.4) and (3.5), for
each sector.
There is evidence that the number of donors has an impact on the level of fungibility (i.e.,
that  k'  is different  from zero), but  only  for the  transport and  communications  (T&C)  and
9 In equation  (3.3) this coefficient  only had the subscripts  2 and s. Now it is allowed  to vary across
countries  and across  time (see equation  3.4). Thus  we add i and t as subscripts.
10  The country  dummies  operate  in the usual  way: CDummyj  takes  the value 1 for country  j, and 0
otherwise.
17education sectors" 1. The regression results in the previous sub-section showed that: (i) aid is fully
fungible (  0) in the agriculture, industry and health sectors, and: (ii) aid is partially flingible
(O <  < 1)  in  the  energy,  transport  and  communications  (T&C)  and  education  sectors.
According to the results shown in table 5, the partial fungibility of aid in the T&C and education
sectors is negatively related to the number of aid donors to a recipient country. This supports our
hypothesis  that the number of donors has an inverse relationship with, and is a proxy  for, the
degree of monitoring exerted by donors, at least for the T&C and education sectors.
[Table 5]
3.5 Has fungibility  changed over time?
To see if the degree of fungibility has changed over time for sector-specific aid, we again
modify equation (3.3), this time allowing the coefficient X2,5 to be a function of time:
A,x, =  mO,.  + m,'t  (3.7)
where t = 1 for the year 1971, t = 2 for the year 1972, and so on. (The procedure is similar to that
described in the previous subsection, except that  X2,s is now a function of time, and not of the
number of donors.) We now get the following estimable equation:
Gjs,, =  j5 + 2>sGDPj,, + mOs  Cloan,i, + ml, (Cloans,,,,. t) + 23,(Gs  -Gi7s,)
+ 24 s (Tloan,, - Cloanj  ,, ) + 25sTGrantsj,,  + qj,st  (3.8)
The results from estimating (3.8) are shown in Table 6.
[Table 61
" As noted  at the bottom of table 4, Botswana  is evidently  an outlier for the education  regression.  The
analysis  in the text focuses  on regression  (5.7), without  Botswana  in the sample.
18The coefficient of "concessionary loans '> time" is not statistically significant in any of the
regressions.12  Hence there is no strong evidence of fungibility changing over time (i.e., there is
no  clear evidence of ml,, in equation 3.7 being different from zero). In the education sector,
however, there  is some weak evidence of fungibility increasing over time.  The coefficient of
"concessionary loans to sector" in regression (4.7) from table 4 is statistically significant. But the
same coefficient in regression (6.7)-which  has the additional term "concessionary loans x time"
on the right-hand side-is  not. The presence of this additional term should make little difference
to the regression results if indeed the true ml,, is zero for the education sector. The fact that its
introduction lowers the coefficient of "concessionary loans to sector" suggests that the true ml,,
is negative, i.e., that  fungibility has increased over time.  In sum, there is some evidence that
fungibility has increased  over  time  for the  education sector, although  it is  statistically weak
evidence. For the other five sectors, the data show that fungibility has not changed over time.
4.  Conclusion
This paper  set out to  explore two issues: (i) the extent of  aid fungibility in  Sub-Saharan
Africa; and (ii) reasons why aid was fungible or not. In terms of the first question, we find that
the broad pattern  of aid  fungibility observed  in cross-country  and country-specific  studies  is
reflected in our analysis of African countries. Specifically, we find relatively little evidence that
aid leads to greater tax relief in Africa; every dollar of aid leads to an increase in government
spending of 90 cents. We reiterate that the implications of this result are by no means clear-cut.
If the marginal cost of taxation is exceptionally high-and  there is some evidence that this is so
in African countries (see Devarajan, et al. [1998])-then  using aid for tax relief may well be the
12For the education  sector,  the relevant  regression  in table 6 is (6.7) and not (6.6). This is because
Botswana  is an outlier for this sector; see notes for table 4.
19best use of foreign resources. The effect of aid on the composition of public spending between
current and capital expenditures is also broadly consistent with international evidence. Aid in
Africa leads to an increase in current and capital spending in equal amounts. Again, we note that,
even if all aid was intended to finance capital expenditures, the reallocation to current spending
may  not  necessarily  be harmful.  One of Africa's  problems is the  chronic underspending  on
operations  and maintenance.  Interestingly, we  find that  an  almost equal  amount of  aid goes
towards repaying the principal on past loans.  On the surface, this appears to be a striking result.
Very  few  donors  would  have  explicitly  given  aid in  order  to  repay  loans.  But  on  further
reflection, this is not so surprising. The inability to meet debt-service payments threatened many
African countries with a complete cut-off from foreign capital. The use of aid resources to relax
this constraint  could have been quite rational. Moreover, the fungibility of loans intended for
particular sectors in Africa roughly mirrors a pattern found with a broader sample of countries,
with  some exceptions. Aid  to energy and transport and communication sectors lead to  some
increase in public spending in those sectors, but it is by no means one-for-one. By contrast, in the
worldwide sample, aid to transport and communications was almost fully nonfungible.'3 Finally,
aid to the education sector-which  had no discernible effect on education spending in the global
sample-has  an almost one-for-one effect on education sector spending in Africa. In any event,
even in these partially fungible sectors, governments spend more out of aid resources than they
do out of their own resources at the margin. Aid to Africa is partially fungible: governments do
not spend all sectoral aid in that sector, nor do they treat such aid as merely budgetary support.
Our answers to the second question shed light on the findings about partial fungibility. We
find that as the number of donors to a country increases, aid is more likely to be fungible. If we
13 Though  nonfungibility  of aid to a sector  as a whole does not preclude  aid fungibility  within the
sector.
20accept the notion that the number of donors represents a proxy for monitoring costs, then it is not
surprising that  most  aid is  partially  fungible. Recipients are trading  off the  benefits  of full
fungibility with the costs. When these costs are low, such as when there are a large number of
donors in a country, we observe greater fungibility.
The implications of these results are threefold. First, the development community seems to
have swung from a denial of the existence of fungibility (with some notable exceptions) to the
other extreme of accepting that all aid is fungible. The facts seem to indicate, though, that aid is
partially  fungible.  On the  one  hand,  this  strengthens the  conclusion  that  donors  should  be
concerned with the quality of the overall public expenditure program of the recipient country. It
also  confirms the importance  of donor coordination. On the other hand,  our results  seem to
indicate  that  aid  to  particular  sectors does  have an  influence on the  composition  of public
spending,  so that  sectoral  aid  programs  and  projects,  have  a  role  to  play  in  development
assistance.  Second, our preliminary findings about the influence of the number of donors on
fungibility suggest that further work on the costs of fungibility to the recipient may be a fruitful
area of research. Third, countries that are highly aid dependent and where aid is fungible, would
be hurt most if the level of aid is reduced. This is because in the case of aid being fungible, its
reduction  would  be  equivalent  to  a  decrease  in  the  country's  own revenue.  Another  issue,
hitherto unstudied, is fungibility across donors: in a country, does increased aid from one donor
increase  or  decrease  aid  from  other  donors?  These  issues  are  probably  best  addressed  in
individual country studies. But,  for policy purposes, it is also useful-not  to say essential-to
pull these studies together into a cross-country analysis, as we have attempted here.
21Data Appendix
I  Sample: Size and selection
The sample used in the empirical analysis comprises 280 observations from 18 Sub-Saharan
African countries, from the years  1971 to 1995. The 18 countries are: Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon,  Ethiopia,  Ghana,  The  Gambia,  Kenya,  Liberia,  Lesotho,  Madagascar,  Malawi,
Mauritius, Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Sample size and selection were based entirely on data availability. We started by collecting
all available  data on the  relevant variables for  Sub-Saharan African countries,  for the  years
1971-95  (see sources listed below; 1971 is the first year and  1995 is the last year, for which
sector-specific loan data is available). A country was included in the sample if it had complete
information on all variables (aggregate as well as sector-specific) for at least  10 years of the
chosen time period.
All  aid and government expenditure/revenue variables,  as well as gross  domestic product,
were  converted  to  1995 US$.  Conversion from local  currency units to  US$  was done using
World Bank conversion factors (which in most cases are the same as the official exchange rates
reported in the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund).
II. Data sources
*  Data on foreign aid are from Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients
(OECD  1998) and from World Bank's database
*  Data on principal repayments on concessionary loan and interest payments on foreign debt
are from OECD (1998).
*  Data  on  government  expenditure,  excepting  concessionary  loan  repayments,  are  from
22Government Finance Statistics (International Monetary Fund, various years).
*  Data on gross domestic product, agricultural output as a share of GDP,  and exchange rates are
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank); World Bank conversion factors were
used for exchange rates.
*  Data on infant mortality rates and gross enrollment rates in primary and secondary schools
are from United Nations Social Indicators.
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26Table 1: Summary Statistics
(constant per capita 1995US$, except ratios which are in percent)
Sample  Standard  Minimum  Maximum
Variable  mean  deviation  [country mean]  [country mean]
1.  Government expenditure
Total expenditure  249  233  39 (Burkina Faso)  691 (Botswana)
Capital expenditure  58  58  5 (Burkina Faso)  252 (Botswana)
Current expenditure  185  188  32 (Burkina Faso)  525 (Botswana)
Repayments on concessionary loans  5  11  0.50 (Zaire)  12 (Swaziland)
Share of total expenditure in GDP  27.8  11.8  11.2 (Burkina Faso)  52.7 (Lesotho)
2.  Foreign aid
Total aid  62  46  2 (Nigeria)  151 (Botswana)
Concessionary loans  21  19  1 (Nigeria)  40 (Swaziland)
Grants  40  36  2 (Nigeria)  119 (Botswana)
Share of total aid in GDP  10.0  8.0  0.2 (Nigeria)  20.8 (Gambia)
3.  Gross domestic product  837  627  178 (Ethiopia)  1,951 (Mauritius)
Note: 1. The above numbers are for our sample of 280 observations, from 18 Sub-Saharan African countries.
(See Data Appendix for more details.)
2. Foreign aid above refers to Official Development Assistance as reported by OECD.
27Table 2. Least Squares Regressions: Government Expenditure on Foreign Aid
Equation  (2.1)  (2.2)  (2.3)  (2.4)  (2.5)
Total  Domestic  Capital  Current  Principal
Dependent variable  expenditure  resources 2 expenditure 3 expenditure 3 repayments 3
2.59  2.59  0.93  1.93  -0.25
Constant  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.69)  (1.37)  (-0.39)
0.11  0.11  0.03  0.08  0.001
GDPt-l  (4.89)  (4.89)  (3.21)  (7.81)  (0.25)
0.89  -0.11  0.28  0.30  0.31
Foreign aid 4 (5.89)  (-0.72)  (4.30)  (4.31)  (10.07)
0.28  0.72  0.007
Residuals from regression (2-2)  (10.03)  (24.75)  (0.56)
Overall  R-squared  0.22  0.14  0.34  0.74  0.29
Model'  Fixed  Fixed  Random  Random  Random
Note: 1. Before  regressing,  all variables  were converted  to constant  1995  US$  per capita.  Regressions  were
done in first differences  based on a sample  of 280 observations,  from 18  countries  (see Data  Appendix  for more
details).  Parentheses  indicate  t-statistics.
2. The variable  "Domestic  Resources"  is defmed  as all expenditure  financed  from domestic  resources,  i.e., total
expenditure  minus  foreign  aid.
3. Total expenditure  are divided  into  three components:  capital,  current,  and principal  repayments.  The latter
include  only  repayments  on foreign  concessionary  loans.
4. Foreign aid is defmed as Official Development  Assistance  (the definition  used by the Organisation  for
Economic  Co-operation  and Development).
5. Model  indicates  whether  the country  dummies  in the regression  represent  a fixed  effects  or a random  effects
model. The Hausman  test statistic  was used  to select  the appropriate  model.
28Table  3. Least  Squares  Regressions:  Government  Expenditure
on  Concessionary  Loans  and  Grants
Equation  (3.1)  (3.2)  (3.3)  (3.4)  (3.5)
Total  Domestic  Capital  Current  Principal
Dependent  Variable  expenditure  resources 2 expenditure 3 expenditure 3 repayments 3
2.59  2.59  0.95  2.01  -0.36
Constant  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.70)  (1.44)  (-0.63)
0.11  0.11  0.03  0.08  0.001
GDP,,  (4.88)  (4.89)  (3.21)  (7.95)  (0.20)
0.89  -0.11  0.32  0.51  0.06
Concessionary  loans 4 (3.81)  (-0.44)  (3.20)  (4.89)  (1.30)
0.89  -0.11  0.25  0.14  0.51
Grants 4 (4.42)  (-0.52)  (2.87)  (1.54)  (13.67)
Residuals  from regression  (3-2)  0.28  0.72  0.01
(10.02)  (25.07)  (0.61)
Overall  R-squared  0.22  0.14  0.34  0.74  0.43
Model  Fixed  Fixed  Random  Random  Random
Note: See table 2 for notes 1,2,3,  and 5.
4. Official  Development  Assistance  is the aid variable.  It is subdivided  into its two components:  grants  and
concessionary  loans.
29Table  4. Panel  Data  Regressions:  Sectoral  Expenditure  and Concessionary  Loans
Equation  (41)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7)  (4.8)  (4.9)
Education
Dependew  2  without
variabl.  Total  Agriculture  Energy  Industry  T&C.  Education
2 Botswana
2 Health  Other
Constant  2.5)  -1.21  -0.04  -0.23  -0.11  0.26  3.00**  -0.62  2.41**
(0.84)  (-0.92)  (-0.15)  (-0.68)  (-0.13)  (0.17)  (2.08)  (-1.20)  (2.30)
GDP,-,  0.II**  0.01  0.002  0.004  0.01*  0.02**  0.01**  0.004**  0.06*
(4.89)  (1.33)  (1.25)  (1.61)  (1.82)  (5.20)  (3.78)  (3.20)  (8.27)
Foreign  aid  0.89**
(5.87)
Concessionary  -0.04  0.13*  0.11  0.36**  -0.80**  0.98**  0.26  0.65**
loanstosector  (-0.45)  (1.72)  (1.57)  (2.62)  (-2.93)  (2.10)  (0.66)  (6.50)
Concessionary  0.A11*  0.004  0.002  -0.03  -0.05  -0.06*  0.002  0.13
loans  to all other  (2.63)  (0.24)  (0.07)  (-0.50)  (-1.60)  (-1.77)  (0.15)  (1.26)
sectors
Total  grants  (to all  0.10**  -0.03  0.01  0.09*  0.08**  0.07*  0.03**  0.12*
sectors)  (2.78)  (-1.64)  (0.58)  (1.67)  (2.50)  (1.89)  (2.80)  (1.80)
Agriculture  as  0.05
share  of GDP,-,  (1.14)
Primary  school  0.03  -0.007
enrolment  ratet-I  (1.17)  (-0.28)
Secondary  school  -0.06  -0.11**
Enrolment  rate,,  (-1.25)  (-2.42)
Infant  mortality  0.008*
ratet-l  (1.72)
Residuals  from
domestic  0.07**  0.01**  0.02**  0.13**  0.14**  0.12**  0.04**  0.57**
resources  (6.66)  (2.50)  (2.87)  (7.44)  (13.19)  (10.75)  (10.46)  (26.90)
regression
R-squared  0.22  0.20  0.06  0.06  0.23  0.49  0.40  0.36  0.78
Model  Fixed  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random
*indicates  the same at the 10 percent significance level.
*  * indicates that a coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent significance level.
Note:  1. The large negative coefficient of  "concessionary loans to sector" in the education regression is reversed when
Botswana is dropped. Botswana is hence an outlier; the analysis in the text focuses on regression (4.7), without Botswana in the
sample.
2. Other expenditure is defined as total expenditure less spending on the six sectors.
30Table 5. Estimates for hk,  or the Impact of the Number of Donors On The Level of Fungibility
Equation  (5.2)  (5.3)  (5.4)  (5.5)  (5.6)  (5. 7)  (5.8)  (5.9)
Education
without
Dependent variable  Agriculture  Energy  Industry  T&C  Education  Botswana  Health  Other
Number  of donors  <D
concessionary  loans
to sector  (estimated
-0.07  -0.02  0.01  -0.12**  -0.17  -0.38*  -0.36  -0.10**
coefficient  or hs)  (-1.21)  (-0.69)  (0.44)  (-2.39)  (-0.90)  (-1.67)  (-1.34)  (-2.24)
Note: The information for the table came from estimating equation (3.5) in the text, for each sector. Due to the large
number of regressors, only h,,  or the coefficient of "number of donors < concessionary loans to sector", is reported
for each sector regression.  For notes 2 to 4 see table 4.
31Table  6. Panel  Data Regressions:  Sectoral  Expenditure  and Concessionary  Loans,
With  Aid Fungibility  as a Function  o Time
Equation  (6.1)  (6.2)  (6.3)  (6.4)  (6.5)  (6.6)  (6.7)  (6.8)  (6.9)
Education
without
Dependent variable  Total  Agriculture  Energy  Industry  T&C  Education2 Botswana 2 Health  Other
3
Constant  2.59  -1.21  -0.01  -0.22  0.03  0.14  3.04**  -0.40  2.36**
(0.84)  (-0.92)  (-0.05)  (-0.67)  (0.97)  (0.09)  (2.10)  (-0.77)  (2.23)
GDP,-,  0.11**  0.005  0.002  0.004  0.01*  0.02**  0.01**  0.004**  0.06**
(4.89)  (1.29)  (1.17)  (1.58)  (1.72)  (5.84)  (3.77)  (3.25)  (8.13)
Foreign aid  0.89**
(5.87)
Concessionary  -0.09  0.48**  0.16  0.77**  3.63**  1.23  1.34  0.59**
loans to sector  (-0.76)  (1.99)  (0.99)  (2.31)  (4.01)  (1.15)  (1.24)  (3.50)
Concessionary  0.01  -0.02  -0.006  -0.03  -0.28**  -0.03  -0.07  0.006
loans xtimet4  (0.64)  (-1.54)  (-0.37)  (-1.36)  (-5.11)  (-0.26)  (-1.10)  (0.38)
Concessionary  0.11**  0.005  0.003  -0.03  -0.05  -0.06*  0.002  0.13
loans to all other  (2.62)  (0.29)  (0.12)  (-0.46)  (-1.62)  (-1.76)  (0.20)  (1.26)
sectors
Total grants (to all  0.09**  -0.03*  0.01  0.09  0.08**  0.07*  0.03**  0.12*
sectors)  (2.65)  (-1.81)  (0.56)  (1.59)  (2.63)  (1.86)  (2.64)  (1.78)
Agriculture as share  0.05
of GDP,-,  (1.12)
Primary school  0.03  -0.005
enrolment ratet-l  (1.21)  (-0.25)
Secondary school  -0.05  -0.11**  0.006




domestic  0.07**  0.01**  0.02**  0.13**  1.33**  0.12**  0.04**  0.57**
resources  (6.62)  (2.41)  (2.89)  (7.42)  (13.001)  (10.75)  (10.38)  (26.86)
regression
R-squared  0.22  0.20  0.06  0.06  0.23  0.52  0.41  0.36  0.78
Model  Fixed  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random  Random
Note: See notes  I to 3 in table  4.
4. t is an index  variable  indicating  the year.  Specifically,  t = 1 for the year  1971 (the first  year  in the sample),  t =




4-  \  Budget constraint
with aid
Budget constraint
without aid  -- *
g1*  gl**  gi
4-  AID _
Note: The bold lines and indifference curves illustrate the case where O<  0 < (1 - a)/p  (see main text). The dotted
line shows the budget constraint if 0 = 0. Point A is the chosen point if 8 > (1-a)/3.
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